Even today, people associate the creation of the first Atomic Bomb with Oppenheimer or Groves. But the father of the Atomic Bomb was really Dr. Leo Szilard, a Hungarian physicist who first began to ponder an atomic chain reaction in 1933. Szilard was fascinated by a revolutionary novel, The World Set Free," by H.G. Wells written in 1913. "It prophesied a process of 'atomic disintegration' that unleashed 'limitless power' and led to global nuclear war. The conflict spread until two hundred cities lay shattered by the 'unquenchable crimson conflagrations of the atomic bombs.'" (Wyden, 20). But while Szilard may have been the first to fantasize about the atomic bomb, he was not the first to begin research.
While running an experiment in 1938, German scientist Otto Hahn came upon an unexplainable phenomenon. His assistant Lise Meitner informs him that he has split an atom. Americans feared that the Germans would make the first atomic bomb, so Samuel Goudsmit headed a team that captured the Nazi's plans for building the bomb. Part of the reason that we were so successful in building the A-Bomb was that we had seen first hand what the Germans had done wrong while dismantling their "Uranium Machine" (Wyden, 260).
But even this was not enough to raise Szilard's confidence. In fact, Szilard was so sure that the Germans would win the war that he refused to be fingerprinted . Nevertheless, "Only Szilard had his eye graphically on the future. 'One has to visualize a world in which a lone airplane could appear over a big city like Chicago, drop his bomb, and thereby destroy the city in a single flash"(Wyden, 48). Szilard was just one of the men that contributed to the creation of the A-Bomb. But it is ironic that a majority of the people involved all fit the same profile: White , upper-middle class men.
But when it came down to actually making the A-Bomb, it was J. Robert Oppenheimer who made it all happen. Oppenheimer had been a well respected professor at Berkeley. He recruited Dr. Robert R. Wilson, along with his wife Jane to come to New Mexico to work on a project that Oppenheimer promised "would win the war". Oppie (as he came to be known) was very secretive about the whole matter, but promised the Wilsons that they would be rich (Wyden 93). Szilard, on the other hand, was not impressed by Oppenheimer's campaign, and refused to go to New Mexico to contribute to the project. "'Nobody could think straight in a place like that,' he [Szilard] told friends at the Metlab. 'Everybody who goes there will go crazy'" (Wyden, 95).
The issue of whether or not the scientists would become part of the army was introduced by Groves, but only served to divide the scientists. Oppenheimer was against this idea. "Crisscrossing the country on missions with Oppenheimer to get Los Alamos [the experimentation site in New Mexico] rolling, he argued that it was a rotten idea for the scientists to join the army. What would happen if arbitrary orders from above were 'nonsensical'? And what scientists ever got first-class results by following instructions unquestioningly?'"... "Scientists needed to be independant. They had to question judgments. Openness to trial and error, not rigidity, had to be encouraged"... "So groves backed down. The scientists would remain civilians" (Wyden, 95).
These kinds of disagreements sustained the animosity within the operators of the most deadly weapon history has ever seen. The creators of the bomb "did not regard it as a new weapon but as a revolutionary change in the relations of man to the universe' and 'that we were looking at this like statesmen and not like merely soldiers anxious to win the war at any cost.' The bomb must not become 'a Frankenstein which would eat us up'" (Wyden, 158). The bomb was thought by it's creators to be a tool of peace. They knew that Americans were tired of the war and would want it used immediately since it would serve two purposes: 1. To make the Russians more receptive to negotiations, and 2. To get the Japanese to surrender and thus end the war.
It is a common misconception that the scientists who worked on the bomb had no moral understanding of the mass destruction they were allowing. But this is not true. "Loss of life troubled him [Stimson] deeply, no matter how unavoidable it might be" (Wyden, 164). Another example of the ethical behavior of these men is found in General Marshall, who wanted to give the Japanese fair warning by designating certain military targets and then warning the people to leave so that the Japanese would know that the US intended only to destroy these centers, and not kill civilians. "Marshall emphasized the moral value of giving the Japanese advance notice. [Marshall said] 'Every effort should be made to keep our record of warning clear'" (Wyden, 159). However it was decided, after much thought, that giving the Japanese advance notice would be impossible since their air force could seriously interfere with the fragile atomic bomb and "such an end to an advertised demonstration of power would be much worse than if the attempt had not been made" (Wyden, 160). The part of the bombing that would prove successful was the element of surprise, and that would be lost if an "open test over Japanese territory were made first and failed to bring surrender... [plus] it would make the Japanese ready to interfere with an atomic attack if they could" (Wyden, 161). Byrnes made a point that if the Japanese knew ahead of time where they were going to be bombed, then they might bring the American Prisoners of War to that place, and put the army in an even more difficult situation. And so it was decided that there was no way in which a demonstration could be made that would be convincing enough to stop the war (Wyden, 161).
And so it was decided that the only way to end the war and save lives (in the long run) would be to order a surprise attack on Japan. Hiroshima was decided upon because "Hiroshima according to prisoner of war reports is the only one of four target cities for Centerboard (code name for the A-Bomb) that does not have allied prisoner of war camps" (Wyden, 238). So the US army was doing everything it could to save American lives.
There is no refuting the fact that hundreds of thousands of Japanese civilians had to die in order to end the war, but who is to say that more lives would have been lost if the bomb had not been dropped.
"At 12:15 am (August 6- the day the bomb was dropped) (Colonel) Tibbets motioned to the Lutheran chaplain, who asked the crews to bow their heads as he sought heavenly assistance for their mission: 'We pray Thee to be with those who brave the heights of Thy heaven... armed with Thy strength may they bring this war to a rapid end...'"(Wyden, 242). And these brave men did just that.
Pros and Cons of Nuclear Disarmement This site speaks both for and against nuclear disarmement. It uses related websites and organizations to prove either side. |
Military Policy Committee Minutes, May 5, 1943 This information was taken from the Top Secret Folders that now reside in the National Archives in Washington DC. It discusses why Japan was a better target than Germany since the Japanese would be less likely to cultivate information from the bomb and use it against the US. Summary of Target Committee Meetings on May 10 & 11, 1945 The minutes from these meetings depict the lack of knowledge that the committee actually had about the bomb and it's effects. The target committee is discussing the height from which the bomb would be dropped, and chooses to use the most conservative figures to protect the pilot since so little was known about how the bomb would react. |
World War II Preservation Society This site is not necessarily in favor of the bombing, but it is a place to honor those who served, on either side of WWII. The American Legion National Headquarters The American Legion National Headquarters and the National Department of Defense work together to encourage young men and women to serve their country in the military. |
